The current structure of the USAF in the warzone is based on a pre-internet model from an airlift perspective. The TACC at Scott AFB, in conjunction with US TRANSCOM, vet and assign transportation to all DoD users around the world. They are permanently staffed and have many thousands of dollars in programs, apps, etc. that allow them to manage hundreds of missions per day. Suddenly, in the AOR (Afghan/Iraq) a whole other HQ staff, building, etc. is made to run assets inside this zone. TACC still runs hundreds of missions (strat mission) in the AOR, AMD runs a few dozen tactical missions. Simply put, with the total overhead of a major mobility command center (cost of op & manning) the AMD & CDDOC only perform a fraction of the functionality that TACC & US TRANSCOM's DDOC perform. It's like owning an entire second home just so you have another garage to house your motorcycle. The logical thing would be so simply add-on to your existing garage to house your motorcycle. The cost of building a base, bunkers, comm. gear, dining halls, billets, bathrooms etc. just to perform a job which accounts for perhaps 30% of the overall missions seems like a waste as opposed to adding a few more jobs at the existing base in Illinois and doing it all from there. Col (ret) John Warden, the architect behind Gulf War 1, explained it well that over time telecommunications and the power of modern aircraft eliminate the need for all of these layers of staffs. Where once, if you needed 1,000 C-47s to fly (ala the Berlin airlift) you (the general) need to tell 10 people the plan, so they tell 10, etc. Today, 5 C-17s crewed by 10 people can do the same job, so you don't need all that staff & with the fact that missions are built & assigned by computer across the internet, the physical location of the building is irrelevant. Efficiencies in the forward deployed locations are lost due to swap outs whereas permanent assignments don’t make massive errors during the change over periods.